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Complementarities in Innovation Policy*
Pierre Mohnen†, Lars-Hendrick Röller‡
Résumé / Abstract
Nous développons dans cet article un cadre qui permette de tester des
complémentarités dans les politiques d’innovation à partir de données
européennes sur les obstacles à l’innovation. Nous proposons un test discret de
supermodularité en matière de politique à l’innovation qui repose sur un certain
nombre de contraintes d’inégalité. Ce test s’appliquera à deux types de décision en
innovation : innover ou non, et si oui, de combien? Nous constatons beaucoup de
complémentarités au niveau des industries. Dans certaines industries la
complémentarité touche l’ensemble des aspects pouvant donner lieu à des
obstacles. Nous trouvons aussi que le manque de travailleurs spécialisés est
complémentaire à tous les autres obstacles dans presque toutes les industries.
Dans ce sens, nous résultats suggèrent que la détention de capital humain au
niveau des entreprises est un élément essentiel dans une politique de l’innovation.
This paper develops a framework for testing discrete complementarities in
innovation policy using European data on obstacles to innovation. We propose a
discrete test of supermodularity in innovation policy leading to a number of
inequality constraints. We apply our test to two types of innovation decisions: to
innovate or not, and if so, by how much. We find that industries display a
considerable amount of complementarity, with some industries being
complementary across all obstacles. We also find that the lack of internal human
capital (skilled personnel) is complementary to all the other obstacles in almost
all industries. In this sense, our results suggest that internal human capital is key
for any innovation policy, insofar that it is complementary to all the other factors
that might hamper innovation activities.
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11. Introduction
The question as to whether policy variables are interrelated is important. In fact, this is one of the
more central issues in policy analysis. Changing one policy variable may have no effect – or
indeed an undesirable effect – if other policy variables are not changed at the same time.
Understanding these interlinkages amongst choice variables may indeed be a prerequisite to
successfully handle today’s policy challenges. For example, what is the use of giving out R&D
tax incentives to stimulate R&D, if the requisite R&D workforce is not available?
A prominent arena where such interlinkages are often cited is in the study of innovation.
Innovation patterns display considerable variation across industries and countries. It is often
argued that innovation is a complex outcome, influenced by many factors that are interrelated.
More importantly, the interrelatedness of those factors is often described as one that is
complementary, i.e. the factors act together and reinforce each other (Dosi, 1988). This paper
provides a simple framework for empirically identifying and measuring complementarities in
innovation policy.
A group of activities is complementary if doing more of any subset of them increases the returns
from doing more of any subset of the remaining activities. In a standard (differentiable)
framework, complementarity between a set of variables means that the marginal returns to one
variable increases in the level of any other variable, or more formally that the cross-partial
derivatives of some payoff function are positive. However, complementarity can also be present
when the decision variables are discrete. The notion of complementarities per se requires only
that some order relation be put on the objects under consideration. This observation has lead to
the actual formalization of the concept within the mathematical theory of lattices, which started
with the work of Arthur Veinott and Donald Topkis (see for instance, Topkis (1978))1.
The formalization of complementarities to discrete structures permits the analysis of such
complex and discrete entities as organizational structures, institutions, and government policies.
It provides a way to capture the intuitive ideas of synergies and systems effects, i.e. that "the
whole is more than the sum of its parts." Furthermore, it constitutes the starting point for an
understanding of the failure of piecemeal approaches to policy. For if the various elements of a
given organization are complements, then adopting only some of the features of a better
performing organization may not yield equivalent or better performance; it might actually worsen
the current situation.
The study of complementarity has subsequently been introduced into economics. Paul Milgrom
and John Roberts have considerably extended the initial work of Topkis and Veinott and
pioneered its application to economics (see, for instance, Paul Milgrom and John Roberts
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 Specifically, a lattice is a partially ordered set where each pair of elements { }ba,  has a least upper bound, noted
ba ∧ , and a greatest lower bound, noted ba ∨ . Two objects a  and b  are then called complementary if the
corresponding payoff function Π  is supermodular, that is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )bbabaa Π−∨Π≤∧Π−Π .
2(1990)). For a recent reference on the theory of supermodularty and complementarity see Topkis
(1998)2.
An innovation system is often said to have discrete characteristics encompassing a set of
institutions, laws, incentives, and customs. Most importantly, factors are said to create a set of
complementarities, through which decision variables reinforce each other. A consequence of this
is that piecemeal policy may not be successful, as one-dimensional policy prescriptions in
isolation will not produce the desired outcomes.
This paper develops a framework for testing discrete complementarities in innovation policy. Our
approach is based on governments choosing a set of parameters (policies) at the national level in
order to maximize innovation activities. A trade-off for the government is introduced by
assuming that policies have different effects on innovation activities at the industry level. For
example, mandatory patenting might be a good policy in pharmaceuticals where it is easy to
define a new product and customary for firms to patent, but it might be detrimental in other
industries where secrecy is preferred to patenting as a means to appropriate innovation benefits.
Another example might be tax credits. Handing out tax credits to promote R&D and innovation
will help profitable and well-established firms but will be useless and maybe even
counterproductive for startup firms or loss-making enterprises (Eisner, Albert and Sullivan
(1984)). Finally, a legal system clearly defining and defending property rights provides a reliable
and congenial framework for growing firms, but too much regulation and concerns about
establishing property rights might stand in the way of innovation diffusion.
Within this trade-off for policy decisions by government we like to ask whether policy decisions
are complementary. If so, we would expect certain policy actions to occur together in order to
maximize the impact on innovation activities. To address this question, we will assume that the
impact of policy actions on the innovation activity in a given industry is identical across
countries. In other words, staying with the above example, mandatory patenting is an innovation
enhancing policy in pharmaceuticals in all countries. This assumption will lead to a similar trade-
off for all countries, which implies that the complementarities are industry specific3.
Even though the trade-off is the same for all countries, this does not imply that countries will all
choose the same set of policies. Our approach will assume that there are country and industry-
specific factors. For instance, countries or industries might differ because of their institutional
endowments. According to North (1994, page 360):
“Given that these institutions are likely to be different across countries and industries,
such as institutions, laws, incentives, customs, etc., they will translate into country-
specific and firm-specific heterogeneity, which in turn may lead to different
outcomes.”
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 Another early contribution to economics is Vives (1990). There are also several empirical contributions to the study
of complementarity, see for instance Ichniowski et al. (1997), Athey and Stern (1998), and Miravete and Pernias
(2000).
3
 Alternatively, one could allow for the trade-off to vary across industries and countries. However, this will lead to a
number of complications in the econometric specification. In this sense, our assumption of “global”
complementarities at the industry level is more tractable.
3One of the key identification assumptions of our framework is that these institutional
endowments are separable from the rest of the system. In other words, the complementarity of the
objective function is independent of the endowments. Given this separability assumption, we are
able to develop a conceptual framework within which we can test complementarities in
innovation policies.
Using this framework we are able to specify a discrete test of supermodularity in innovation
policy leading to a number of inequality constraints. Our test is based on directly estimating the
objective function of the policy makers. In principle, testing for complementarity can be achieved
by investigating whether the choice variables are correlated. An alternative approach is to test for
complementarity in innovation policy by directly testing whether the objective function is
supermodular. This is the approach taken in this paper.
We apply our test to a new data set on European firms. For two reasons, we like to differentiate
between two types of innovation activities: the intensity of innovation, conditional on doing any
innovation at all, and whether a firm does any innovation or not. The first reason for considering
the two innovation activities explicitly is that we only observe innovation activities, conditional
on doing any innovation at all. In other words, we have a censoring problem. In order to obtain
consistent estimates of complementarity in innovation, we estimate the probability of being an
innovator, which is then used to correct for the sample selection.
The second reason is that the complementarities may be rather different for the two types of
innovation activities. Policy impacts as well as complementarity in policy may be rather different
for the intensity of innovation, as compared to the likelihood of becoming an innovator.
Our results suggest that industries display a considerable amount of complementarity, with some
industries being complementary across all obstacles. Generally, complementary in the intensity of
innovation appears to be more pronounced than in the probability of becoming an innovator. This
indicates that these two innovation processes, i.e. the intensity of innovation vs. the probability of
becoming an innovator are subject to different constraints. This also implies that policies to
remove obstacles to innovation may result in rather different effects, depending on whether they
are designed to stimulate innovation by incumbents (i.e. the intensity of innovation, conditional
on being an innovator) or to stimulate entry (i.e. increase the probability of becoming an
innovator).
In terms of obstacles we find that the lack of internal human capital (skilled personal) is
complementary with all the other obstacles in almost all industries. This is true for both the
intensity of innovators as well as new innovators. It appears that internal human capital is key,
insofar that it is complementary to all the other factors that might hamper innovation activities. In
terms of innovation policy this finding of human capital complementarity suggests that measures
directed at removing barriers to innovation may be more effective if those measures are also
explicitly directed at increasing the level of internal human capital.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the framework, while Section 3 defines
supermodularity in innovation. Section 4 specifies the test and section 5 discusses the results.
Section 6 concludes.
42. Innovation Policy
We begin by assuming that innovation in each industry is affected by K policy variables, which
are taken by governments at the national level. We denote government actions in country j by a
vector ),....,,( 21 Kjjjj aaaa = . Note that these actions are not industry-specific, and are set at the
economy-wide level.
Innovation takes place at the industry level and is determined by the K policy variables as well as
country-specific and industry-specific exogenous factors denoted by a vector ijθ , such that
),( ijji aI θ , where i denotes the industry. The exogenous factors ijθ  represent institutions, history,
customs, norms, technologies, etc. and are assumed to be separable from the government’s
actions. As we will see below, this allows us to consider the issue of complementarity in actions
independently of the exogenous factors.
Another important assumption we are making is worth emphasizing early: the industry-level
innovation function ),( ijji aI θ  does not depend on the country (except for the institutional
endowments ijθ ). In other words, the effect of the governments actions does not depend on the
country, only the industry. This implies that a particular industry’s needs in terms of policies (for
instance easy finance, flexible labor markets) are identical across all countries. This assumption is
crucial insofar it will imply that complementarity in a particular industry exists either for all
countries, or for no country4.
For conceptional purposes, one could think of a two-stage framework. In stage two, domestic
firms in each industry maximize innovation given a particular policy. Stage one allows for the
national governments to choose the innovation environment. The problem of the government is
then to choose a set of “national parameters” ),....,,( 21 Kjjjj aaaa =  that maximize innovation across
all industries, i.e. ∑
i
ijji
a
aI ),(max θ . A trade-off is present whenever an action has opposite effects
on innovation across industries. For example, an increase in ja1  may increase innovation in
industry i, but decrease innovation in industry i+1. In other words, governments cannot create the
optimal environment for each industry, as they set parameters at the national level.5
Given this environment we like to provide evidence on the existence of complementarity in
government actions. In principle there are two levels at which complementarity could exist: (i)
there could be complementarity at the economy-wide level (macro-complementarity), and/or (ii)
there could be complementarity at the industry level (micro-complementarity). Testing macro-
complementarity would imply a test of whether innovation at the economy-wide level is
complementary in government actions, i.e. whether ∑
i
ijji aI ),( θ  is supermodular in a.
Analogously, testing micro-complementarity would imply a test of whether innovation at the
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 It is unclear as to why the trade-off would vary across countries, given that technologies and thus the constraints
faced by firms should all work in the same direction across countries. For this reason, it appears more reasonable
to base national differences on the exogenous variables rather than the trade-off within an industry.
5
 For example Levin et al. (1987) show that patents are perceived as effective means of appropriability in
Pharmaceuticals but not in most of the other industries.
5industry-wide level is complementary in government actions, i.e. whether ),( ijji aI θ  is
supermodular in a.
Lemma 2.6.1 from Topkis (1978) shows that the sum of supermodular functions defined on a
lattice, is also supermodular. In our context this implies that whenever the innovation function for
all the industries are supermodular, so is the entire country-level objective function. Including
weights on the individual industry innovation functions does not change this result (see Lemma
2.6.1. in Topics (1978)). In other words, micro-level complementarity for all industries implies
macro-level complementarity. The reverse is not true.
Testing for complementarity in innovation policies could, in principle, proceed by checking
supermodularity of ),( ijji aI θ , assuming that data on government actions are available.
Unfortunately, the available data on innovation (see below) do not report government actions.
Instead, we have measures of the obstacles to innovation. Assuming that the relationship between
actions and obstacles is monotone, we can infer complementarity between actions by measuring
complementarity between obstacles. In particular, monotonicity between actions and obstacles is
likely to hold within an industry, which allows us to proxy actions with obstacles. Given that only
obstacles are observable, and assuming that monotonicity between actions and obstacles holds at
the industry-level, we proceed to measure complementarity in actions at the industry level only.
Let the industry-level innovation function be defined as follows,
)),(),....,(),((),( 2211 ijKjkijijiiijji aCaCaCfaI θθ = [1]
where Cki, where k=1,…,K are a number of innovation constraints faced by firms in industry i.
These innovation constraints are in turn determined by the actions of the government in country
j.6 According to the above mentioned trade-off for the government an action may have opposite
effects on obstacles across industries. For example, an increase in ja1  may increase the constraint
iC1  in industry i, but decrease the constraint 1,1 +iC  in industry i+1. In particular, we will assume
that the effect of kja  on )( kjki aC  is weakly monotone for each k, j, and i. In line with the above
argument, we assume that C depends only on the industry and the actions, not the country. This
implies that the effect of an action on a constraint is the same across countries in a given industry,
i.e. complementarity in a particular industry exists either for all countries, or for no country.
Given monotonicity at the industry level, we are able to measure complementarity in actions
through data on obstacles. In other words, we can simplify [1] to,
),,....,,(),( 21 ijkiiiiji CCCfCI θθ = [2]
and test whether [2] is supermodular in the obstacles. Given that we will measure
complementarity in obstacles and that the effects of actions on obstacles are potentially very
different across industries (this is indeed where the government’s trade-off comes from), we are
not able to link our results to precise policy measures. However, we are able to provide evidence
on whether complementarity in policy actions exist.
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 Note that [1] assumes that each action effects exactly one constraint.
63. Supermodularity of the Innovation Function
Given the above framework, we can now define complementarity in innovation policy by
checking whether the innovation function is supermodular in obstacles. Let the innovation
function for industry i be given by [2], where the obstacle set C ( CCi ∈ ) is a set of elements that
form a lattice and the θ ’s are exogenous parameter. We define complementarity of the
innovation function as follows (see for example Milgrom and Roberts 1990, page 516).
Definition: Let iC′  and iC ′′  be two elements in the obstacle set. Then the industry innovation
function ),( ijiCI θ  is supermodular if and only if ),(),(),(),( ijiijiiijiiji CCICCICICI θθθθ ′′∧′+′′∨′≤′′+′ .
We will test this below.
A Simple Example:
A simple example might be useful for illustrative purposes. Suppose there are two binary
decision variables, which implies that the set C consists of four elements { }{ }{ }{ }{ }11,1001,00=C .
For example, a country may adopt flexible labor markets and a market-based financial
system (corresponding to 001 =iC ) or choose less flexible labor markets and less market-
based finance (corresponding to { }114 =iC ), as well as the mixed cases. Define the ordering of
the elements in the set a as the component-wise order under the “max” operation, for
example { } { } { } 432 11)10max,01(max iii CCC ===∨ . This will produce the Hasse diagram below.
Figure 1
{ }114 =iC
{ }103 =iC { }012 =iC
{ }001 =iC
7Using the above definition of supermodularity, several other useful results can be derived. For
example, using properties of systems of complements relating to monotone comparative statics, it
can be shown (see Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) that the comparative statics on the maximizers
( )θ*iC  are unambiguous, whenever ),( ijiCI θ  is supermodular with respect to the lattice C. In other
words, the set of choice variables in C are complementary, moving up or down together in a
systematic, coherent fashion, depending on the environmental parameter ijθ .
Another important result for the empirical implementation below is that it suffices to check
pairwise complementarities in case there are more dimensions than two in the lattice (Topkis,
1978). In other words, a function is supermodular over all its arguments, if and only if all
pairwise components satisfy the above definition.
As was mentioned above, (see Topkis (1978)) the sum of supermodular functions defined on a
lattice is also supermodular. This implies that micro-level complementarity for all industries
implies macro-level complementarity. The reverse is not true.
Given these properties of supermodularity, we now derive the constraints that need to be satisfied
for the industry innovation function to be supermodular. Let the K obstacles to innovation be
binary, i.e. they take on the value of either 1 (high) or 0 (low). Define an element of the set C
( CCi ∈ ) as a string of K binary digits, where the individual binary components of each element of
the set C represent the obstacles to innovation. Thus, there are K2  elements in C. In terms of our
data set below we have chosen 4 obstacles, which implies that K=4. The elements in C are
therefore (0000), (0001), (0010),……,(1111), a total of 16 elements. Define the ordering of the
elements in the set C as the component-wise order under the “max” operation (like in the above
simple example). This implies that the set C is a lattice. Finally, define the innovation function
[2] over the set C.
Using the definition of supermodularity, and the fact that we only need to check pair-wise
elements, it can be shown that the number of nontrivial7 inequality constraints implied by the
definition of supermodularity is equal to ( )∑−
=
−
1
1
22
K
i
K i , where K is the number of obstacles and i=2
(binary). Since K=4, we have a total of 24 nontrivial inequality constraints.
In particular, using the above definition of supermodularity we can write the 4 nontrivial
inequality constraints for obstacle 1 and 2 to be complementary in innovation as,
( ) ( ) ( )XXIXXIXXIXXI 1100)01(10 +≤+ , where { }11,10,01,00=XX [3]
Similarly, the 4 nontrivial inequalities necessary to hold for obstacles 1 and 3 to be
complementary are,
( ) ( ) ( )XXIXXIXXIXXI 1100)10(01 +≤+ , where { }11,10,01,00=XX .
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 The remaining constraints are equalities.
8The remaining 16 constraints corresponding to complementarity between obstacles 1 and 4, 2 and
3, 2 and 4, and 3 and 4 are analogous. Complementarity over all actions is given, whenever all
the 24 inequality constraints are satisfied.
We next turn to the empirical analysis, which will test for complementarity by checking whether
these constraints are accepted by our data on innovation.
4. Empirical Implementation
Testing for complementarity can be achieved by investigating, whether the choice variables are
correlated (see for example Miravete and Pernias (2000)). For instance, within the context of our
simple example above, if the two countries are located at { }11  and { }01 , there is little evidence of
complementarity. However, evidence of complementarity would be if one country is at { }11  and
the other at { }00 . One approach followed by Miravete and Pernias (2000) is to estimate the
correlation in choice variables from the first-order conditions. Generally, this procedure requires
observability of the choice variables, but not the objective.
An alternative approach is to test for complementarity in innovation policy by directly testing
whether the objective function is supermodular, which requires that the objective is observable.
This is the approach followed in this paper.
After a brief description of the data we will then turn to our test of complementarity.
4.1 The CIS data
In 1992, the statistical agency of the European Union - Eurostat - directed a coordinated effort to
collect firm-level data on innovation in the EU member countries. The Community Innovation
Survey (CIS 1) data were collected using a similar questionnaire and comparable sampling
procedures. To date, there has been relatively little econometric analysis of this data set, but
given the information it offers, it is ideally suited for tackling the research tasks described here.
The data set comprises individual firm data on some general characteristics of the firm (main
industry of affiliation, sales, employment, export sales), various innovation measures, numerous
perceptions of factors hampering or fostering innovation, and some economic impact measures of
innovation. We use the CIS 1 survey data from four countries: Ireland, Denmark, Germany, and
Italy.8 The data are made publicly available at a micro-aggregated level, i.e. continuous variables
are averaged over three observations of consecutive rank within an industry. Non-aggregated
individual responses can be used for empirical studies at the Eurostat site in Luxemburg.
However, the micro-aggregation procedures chosen by Eurostat allow us in principle to apply the
full set of micro-econometric techniques even with the aggregated data. The possibility of a
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 France had no questions on innovation obstacles, Portugal and the Netherlands had missing values for some
innovation obstacles, Greece and Norway had too few observations, and the Belgian survey was actually the result
of three regional surveys and therefore not considered homogeneous enough.
9micro-aggregation bias in the presence of nonlinear estimation techniques is an interesting topic
in itself, but we shall not pursue it here.
Of particular importance is a survey question in which firms were asked to evaluate the
importance of potential innovation obstacles. These obstacles can be categorized into four groups
(see Appendix 2): factors relating to risk and finance, factors relating to knowledge-skill within
the enterprise, factors measuring the knowledge-skill outside the enterprise, and finally
regulation. The country heterogeneity in obstacle perception and the complementarity between
these potential impediments are the focus of this paper.
Aggregating the obstacles in each group would be inconsistent with our assumption of obstacle-
specific functions linking constraints to government actions. Therefore we have decided to
analyze four specific obstacles, the most representative a priori of each group: lack of appropriate
sources of finance, lack of skilled personnel, lack of opportunities of cooperation with other firms
and technological institutions, and legislation, norms, regulations, standards, taxation (see
Appendix 2). The respondents had to answer these questions on a Likert scale (one to five).
There may very well be a country specific response bias, which could for instance be due to
differences across countries in survey methods or questionnaires. In order to control our estimates
for such country effects in responding to the questionnaire, we have transformed the responses
into binary responses, according to whether or not the response to each question was above or
below the average country response (for all obstacles and industries), which was 1.89 in Ireland,
2.03 in Denmark, 2.10 in Germany and 1.94 in Italy.
The data have been cleaned for outliers, missing values and inconsistencies. In particular we
dropped firms with less than 20 employees, with sales growth rates higher than 250% or lower
than –40% between 1990 and 1992, with R&D/sales ratios higher than 50%. We eliminate 17%
of the original sample for Denmark, 30% for Ireland, 36% in Germany and 17% in Italy.
4.2 Complementarity Test – Specification
To test the inequality constraints implied by complementarity, we need to get consistent estimates
of the effects of obstacles on innovation. Recall from [2] that the innovation function at the
industry level is determined by the states of obstacles perception as well as other exogenous
industry and country specific effects. Recall further that we have assumed that the function is
separable. We therefore specify the following innovation function for a particular industry
ijjijiji
l
lijliij DZsI
k
εααγ ++⋅+= ∑−
=
.
12
0
[4]
where I  is a measure of innovation. There are a number of possible variables related to
innovative activities in the CIS data set. We use the percentage in sales of innovative products as
our innovation variable. In addition, we control for several exogenous factors that influence
innovation, ijZ . As exogenous shifters we use size dummies, a dummy for whether the firm
belongs to a group, the R&D per sales ratio, a dummy for continuous R&D, and a dummy for
whether the firm is engaged in cooperative R&D. In line with our above framework, we control
10
for industry and country specific exogenous variables, ijθ . We do so by specifying country
specific fixed effects, jD , and by estimating a separate regression for each industry. Summary
statistics of all variables used in [4] are provided in Table 1.
Turning to the obstacles we define lijs  as a dummy variable corresponding to state l in country j
and industry i. For convenience, we define the dummy variables by following the convention of
binary algebra9. Note the in [4] there are 16 state dummies, which are allowed to vary across
industries, but are constant across countries. As discussed above, this is in line with the idea that
the complementarity structure is identical across countries for a given industry, and also a
consequence of the separability assumption. Using this specification of the innovation function
and the definition of the state dummies, we can write the inequality constraints for
supermodularity as a set of restrictions on the coefficients on the state variables10. Using [3] and
[4], the four constraints for obstacles 1 and 2 to be complementary can be compactly written as
(we drop the subscript i for convenience),
 3,2,1,0        where,  12048 =+≤+ ++++ sssss γγγγ  (comp12)
Similarly, the other complementarity conditions can be written as,
 5,4,1,0        where,  10028 =+≤+ ++++ sssss γγγγ  (comp13)
 6,4,2,0s        where,  9018 =+≤+ ++++ ssss γγγγ  (comp14)
 9,8,1,0        where,  6024 =+≤+ ++++ sssss γγγγ  (comp23)
 10,8,2,0        where,  5014 =+≤+ ++++ sssss γγγγ  (comp24)
12,8,4,0        where,  3012 =+≤+ ++++ sssss γγγγ  (comp34)
Note that complementarity over the entire set will involve all 24 constraints to hold for a given
industry. However, complementarity in innovation may also be present over a subset of the above
constraints.
We are now ready to specify our test for supermodularity assuming that we have consistent
estimates of the liγ ’s from [4]. As we mentioned above, it suffices to test obstacles in a pairwise
fashion. For computational reasons, which will become apparent below, we are unable to test all
the 24 inequality constraints simultaneously. We therefore proceed by testing complementarity
for each pair of obstacles separately.
We propose to carry out two types of tests depending on what we choose as our null hypothesis.
The first test takes (weak) supermodulatity as its null hypothesis, while the alternative is no
supermodularity in the innovation function. In this case, the test for complementarity in the
innovation function between obstacles 1 and 2 is given by,
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 In other words, 0ls  corresponds to state 0000, 1ls  to 0001, ….. , 15ls  to 1111.
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3,2,1,0,....0 -: 128s4s00 =≤−++ ++++ sH ss γγγγ  [weak supermodularity]
3,2,1,0,....0 -: 128s4s01 =>−++ ++++ sH ss γγγγ [no supermodularity]
The other 6 complementarity relationships are analogous. Intuitively, complementarity is rejected
when the upper tail of the joint distribution of the parameter constraints corresponding to a pair of
obstacles is sufficiently small. To compute this joint probability for the above test, we need to
integrate a four-variate distribution function. More precisely, at the boundary the null hypothesis
can be expressed as an equality constraint in the form 0=γS , where S is a 4x k2  matrix, where S
is partitioned as ]|||[ 3210 SSSS . Under the null hypothesis ( 0=γS ) the joint restrictions are
distributed as =v )’)ˆcov(,0(~ˆ SSNS γγ , where )ˆcov(γ is the variance-covariance matrix of the
estimated γ coefficients. The p-value of rejecting the null hypothesis is given by the value of the
upper tail distribution of a four-variate normal distribution ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
γ γ γ γ
ϕ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
0 1 2 3
.)(
S S S S
dvv  For instance, a value of
the upper tail for this integral of 0.06 implies that there is a probability of error of 6% by rejecting
the null of supermodularity for a pair of obstacles. In other words, large p-values imply
acceptance of weak supermodularity.
The second test we propose is more conservative, and takes (strong) complementarity as the
alternative. In this case, the test for complementarity in the innovation function between obstacles
1 and 2 is given by (again the other 6 complementarity relationships are analogous),
3,2,1,0,....0 -: 128s4s00 =≥−++ ++++ sH ss γγγγ [no supermodularity]
3,2,1,0,....0 -: 128s4s01 =<−++ ++++ sH ss γγγγ [strong supermodularity]
In this case, no complementarity is rejected when the lower tail of the joint distribution of the
parameter constraints corresponding to a pair of obstacles is sufficiently small. The p-value of
rejecting the null hypothesis is given by the value of the lower tail distribution of a four-variate
normal distribution ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
∞− ∞− ∞− ∞−
γ γ γ γ
ϕ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
0 1 2 3
.)(
S S S S
dvv  For instance, a value of the lower tail for this integral of
0.06 implies that there is a probability of error of 6% by accepting the alternative of
supermodularity for a pair of obstacles. In other words, low p-values indicate evidence in favor of
strong supermodularity.
It is clear that the two tests are just the complement of each other, since they integrate up to the
same values of the constraints. However, the second test is more demanding in terms of finding
supermodularity, since the null hypothesis is chosen as no supermodularity. We therefore report
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 It is worth mentioning that the above specification [4] can also be equivalently written in terms of obstacle
dummies instead of state dummies. In this case, intuitively, the conditions for complementarity concern interaction
effects between obstacles. Note that this is not equivalent to the cross-partials between those two obstacles, since
the derivative w.r.t. a discrete variable is not defined.
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both tests below. To compute the test statistics we need to compute the four-variate integrals,
which is done by using the GHK simulator (see Mariano et al, 2000).11
Before we report our test results, we need to return to the estimation of [4]. Recall that our
supermodularity test is based on consistent estimates of the liγ ’s.
4.3 Econometric Issues and Estimation
An important consideration is to obtain consistent and efficient estimates of the liγ ’s. A
significant problem might arise due to the fact that we observe innovation activity by a particular
firm only if this firm in fact innovates. Many firms in our sample do not innovate at all, i.e. we
have that 0=ijI , which may give rise to serious censoring.
Besides the econometric problem of censoring, which has to be handled properly to lead to
consistent estimates of innovation, we may also be interested to test the hypothesis of
complementarity in whether firms do innovate at all. As we mentioned above, there are actually
two separate effects of obstacles on innovation activities. The first one is on the intensity of
innovation, conditionally on innovating at all. Second, obstacles might prevent a firm from doing
any innovation at all. In principle, a change in the obstacles to innovation will have an impact on
both effects: the probability of innovating and the intensity of innovating.
In order to capture the second effect of obstacles on innovation and to correct for censoring, we
specify a probit model for the probability of innovating (suppressing firm subscripts again):
ijjijiji
l
lijliij DZsPI
k
µββλ ++⋅+= ∑−
=
.
12
0
[5]
where ijPI  is the latent variable corresponding to the probability of innovating, ijZ  are exogenous
variables (size and group dummies in this case), and lijs  are the states of obstacle perception
defined above. Innovating firms have positive values for ijPI , non-innovating firms have negative
values. A firm is considered as innovative if it reports a positive share in sales of innovative
products.12 The error terms ijε and ijµ are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with mean
zero and variance-covariance matrix Σ , with .,,1 212222211 ρσσσσσ === 13
Consistent estimates of the parameters in [4] and [5] are obtained by estimating a generalized
tobit model with maximum likelihood. We maximize the likelihood of observing the binary data
on whether a firm innovates or not, and on the intensity if it is innovative. In order to have
ijµ vary between -∞ to +∞ , we transform ijI , bounded between 0 and 1, to ))1/(ln( ijij II − and add
the corresponding Jacobian to the likelihood function, yielding:
                                                
11
 We thank Donis Bolduc for sharing the Gauss programming of the GHK simulator.
12
 Few firms declare to be innovative in processes and not in products. By focusing on shares in sales of innovative
products, we actually capture process innovations as well.
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 111 =σ for reasons of identification.
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where for notational convenience we drop the i and j subscripts, denote the regressors and
parameters appearing in [4] as 2x and 2β respectively, and those in [5] as 1x and 1β . The index 0
under the summation sign refers to non-innovators and the index 1 to innovators. Φ denotes the
standard normal distribution and ϕ the standard normal density.
The constraints and hypothesis test for complementarity in becoming an innovator are analogous
to the previous sub-section except that the lγ ’s are replaced by the corresponding lλ ’s.
5. Empirical Results
Before we turn to the econometric evidence, we present some descriptive evidence in form of
simple count statistics. The idea is to infer something about complementarity by looking at
occurrences. For instance if obstacle one occurs more often together with obstacle two, rather
than separately, we might conclude that complementarity between the two obstacles exist. Table
2 shows the frequency of occurrences of our 16 states in the full sample of all observations in the
four countries, as well as in the sub-sample of innovating firms. The occurrences are classified in
the order of binary arithmetic.
Looking at Table 2, it is clear that the most frequent responses are the two extremes; zero
everywhere and one everywhere, as well as lack of appropriate sources of finance and zero for
the other obstacles. It appears that there is some evidence of complementarity in this data. In
terms of pairwise complementarity, there are a large number of possible counts to consider. For
example, in the food industry, obstacle 3 (external knowledge) and obstacle 4 (regulation) are
more often perceived similarly (strong if 1, weak if 0) than differently, regardless of how the
other two obstacles are perceived: the occurrence of (0000) plus (0011) is more frequent than
(0001) plus (0010), etc. This holds for both data sets, i.e. ALL FIRMS (top of Table 2) as well as
INNOVATORS (bottom of Table 2). A similar result applies to obstacle 1 (finance) and obstacle
2 (personnel). We therefore have some descriptive evidence of pairwise complementarity.
There is however, also evidence of lack of complementarity. For example, in the metal industry
obstacles 3 and 4 are not complementary as indicated by occurrences: the frequency of (0100)
plus (0111) is smaller than (0101) plus (0110) for INNOVATORS (bottom of Table 2).
Interestingly, the complementarity is present if one considers ALL FIRMS, which implies that
the censoring problem discussed above may be important in determining complementarity.
In sum, it appears that the descriptive evidence regarding supermodularity is mixed. Of course,
looking at counts can only be considered suggestive and yields a very large number of possible
computations. We now turn to a more systematic approach, which further controls for other
exogenous factors.
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Econometric Results
Consistent estimates of the parameters in [4] and [5] for each industry are obtained by estimating
a generalized tobit model with maximum likelihood. We use the estimates of lγˆ  and lλˆ  to
calculate the tests of complementarity described above for both the probability of becoming an
innovator (through lλˆ ) as well as the intensity of innovation (through lγˆ ).14
Table 3 presents the p-values of the first supermodularity test discussed above, i.e. where we
specify weak supermodularity as the null hypothesis. Recall that the p-values indicate the
probability of error by rejecting the null of weak supermodularity for a pair of obstacles. Table 3
presents p-values for each pair of obstacles for every industry and for both the probability to
innovate and for the intensity of innovation. For instance, the hypothesis that lack of finance
(obstacle 1) and lack of internal human capital (obstacle 2) are complementary in affecting the
probability of innovating in the food industry cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of
significance (p-value of .956). In fact, this finding holds for each pair of obstacles in all
industries. In addition, we cannot reject weak supermodularity neither for the intensity of
innovation nor for the probability of becoming an innovator. We therefore conclude that our test
of weak supermodularity unanimously accepts the hypothesis of supermodularity in the
innovation process.
As we indicated above, the second test is more demanding in terms of finding support for the
supermodularity hypothesis. Table 4 presents the p-values of the strong supermodularity test, i.e.
where we specify strong supermodularity as the alternative hypothesis. Recall that the p-values
indicate the probability of error by rejecting the null of no supermodularity. For instance, the
hypothesis that obstacle 1 (finance) and obstacle 2 (internal human capital) are not
complementary in terms of the probability of innovating in the food industry can be rejected at a
5% significance level (p-value of .044)15.
The p-values in Table 4 indicate that the hypothesis of no supermodularity in innovation policy
cannot be rejected for all obstacles and all industries. However, there are a large number of
pairwise complementarities that are statistically significant. This is true for the probability of
being an innovator as well as for the intensity of innovation. It is also clear, that not all the
obstacles are complementary in all industries. In other words, not surprisingly we do not have full
complementarities across all industries. However, several industries display a high degree of
supermodularity in the innovation process. For instance, the food industry, the wood industry, the
machinery and equipment industry, and the vehicle industry all exhibit full complementarities in
the intensity of innovation at a 10% level.
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 We have tested the joint significance of the coefficients relating to the obstacles to innovation. A Wald test
revealed that for most industries the obstacles are jointly significant at a 10% level. The only exception for [4] is
the food industry, which is only significant at the 16% level. The results for [5] are somewhat less significant, even
though most are still significant. The exceptions here are food (20% significance level), textile (30%) non-metallic
(88%) and vehicle (33%).
15
 Note that as expected the values in Tables 3 and 4 are just the complements of each other. For clarity, we present
both tables.
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By contrast, the probability of innovating is much less complementary. In fact, there is no
industry in which full complementarity exists at the 10% level. Nevertheless, there is no single
obstacle that is not complementary to at least one other obstacle. The only exception is the
chemical industry, where obstacle 3 is not complementary to any other obstacle.
We therefore find that all industries display a considerable amount of complementarity, with the
complementary being more pronounced in the intensity of innovation than in the probability of
becoming an innovator. This indicates that these two innovation processes, i.e. the intensity of
innovation vs. the probability of becoming an innovator are subject to different constraints.
Table 3 also shows that all obstacles are complementarity in several industries. In other words,
the four obstacles (finance, internal human capital, external knowledge, and regulation) are
interrelated in a significant subset of the industries, which implies a trade off at the country level
in terms of policy. The highest number of significant complementary relationships for innovation
is estimated between obstacles 2 and 3 (internal human capital and external knowledge) and
obstacles 2 and 4 (internal human capital and regulations), which are both significant at the 10%
level in 10 out of the 11 industries. The former reflects the well-known absorption hypothesis,
according to which internal and external knowledge reinforce each other. The latter indicates that
lack of human capital is more constraining in regulated firms. Considering the probability of
becoming an innovator, we find the highest number of complementary relationships between
finance and internal human capital with 9 out of 11 industries displaying significant
complementarity at the 10% level. The lack of external capital is exacerbated by a lack of skilled
personnel.
6. Conclusion
This paper develops a framework for testing whether complementarities in innovation policy
exist. We specify and estimate an innovation function that allows us to test for supermodularity in
innovation policy. We also differentiate between two separate effects: the first one is on the
intensity of innovation, conditional that a firm does any innovation at all, and secondly, whether a
firm does any innovation or not.
We find that industries display a considerable amount of complementarity, with some industries
being complementary across all obstacles. Generally, complementary in the intensity of
innovation appears to be more pronounced than in the probability of becoming an innovator. This
indicates that these two innovation processes, i.e. the intensity of innovation vs. the probability of
becoming an innovator are subject to different constraints. This also implies that policies to
remove obstacles to innovation may result in rather different effects, depending on whether they
are designed to stimulate innovation by incumbents (i.e. the intensity of innovation, conditional
on being an innovator) or to stimulate entry (i.e. increase the probability of becoming an
innovator).
In terms of obstacles we find that the lack of internal human capital (skilled personal) is
complementary with all the other obstacles in almost all industries. This is true for both the
16
intensity of innovators as well as new innovators. It appears that internal human capital is key,
insofar that it is complementary to all the other factors that might hempen innovation activities.
In terms of innovation policy this finding of human capital complementarity suggests that
measures directed at removing barriers to innovation may be more effective if those measures are
also explicitly directed at increasing the level of internal human capital.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
CIS I, micro-aggregated data, 1992 (sample mean)
Variable FOOD TEXT. WOOD CHEM. PLAST. N.-MET METAL M&E ELEC. VEHIC. NEC
Percentage of
innovators
0.258 0.153 0.228 0.533 0.446 0.249 0.298 0.532 0.531 0.442 0.257
% in sales of innovative
products for innovators
0.349 0.442 0.378 0.341 0.372 0.367 0.373 0.485 0.467 0.476 0.462
Dummy for 20-49
employees
0.561 0.656 0.628 0.376 0.566 0.593 0.625 0.498 0.487 0.461 0.699
Dummy for 50-99
employees
0.171 0.202 0.198 0.196 0.227 0.202 0.189 0.224 0.210 0.190 0.178
Dummy for 100-249
employees
0.155 0.101 0.117 0.209 0.133 0.120 0.121 0.151 0.154 0.161 0.087
Dummy for 250-499
employees
0.063 0.028 0.027 0.098 0.044 0.047 0.037 0.059 0.071 0.079 0.023
Dummy for 500-999
employees
0.030 0.009 0.017 0.058 0.020 0.020 0.017 0.032 0.040 0.042 0.006
Dummy for >999
employees
0.020 0.004 0.013 0.064 0.010 0.017 0.012 0.037 0.039 0.067 0.006
Dummy for being
part of a group
0.248 0.101 0.201 0.515 0.270 0.233 0.203 0.270 0.323 0.277 0.108
Export/sales ratio 0.129 0.206 0.093 0.215 0.228 0.163 0.151 0.342 0.229 0.244 0.244
Number of employees 151 72 94 484 158 147 131 231 291 1203 73
R&D/sales ratio for
innovators
0.011 0.014 0.011 0.032 0.017 0.020 0.019 0.028 0.047 0.030 0.016
% of innovators doing
R&D continuously
0.447 0.427 0.289 0.768 0.527 0.535 0.432 0.656 0.697 0.609 0.403
% of innovators doing
cooperative R&D
0.168 0.052 0.081 0.314 0.119 0.132 0.114 0.167 0.245 0.262 0.052
Number of
observations 1541 4540 1899 1059 963 1433 3372 2930 1964 788 1578
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Table 2: Obstacle Occurrences
Obstacle
Occurrences 0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111
ALL FIRMS
Industries
FOOD 0.244 0.022 0.015 0.006 0.023 0.016 0.009 0.016 0.130 0.053 0.019 0.036 0.045 0.059 0.045 0.262
TEXTILE 0.297 0.029 0.016 0.010 0.022 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.183 0.075 0.035 0.050 0.057 0.051 0.043 0.106
WOOD 0.258 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.021 0.016 0.010 0.015 0.139 0.043 0.019 0.033 0.050 0.068 0.048 0.256
CHEM 0.265 0.051 0.010 0.009 0.023 0.026 0.007 0.016 0.150 0.091 0.026 0.065 0.054 0.065 0.032 0.111
PLASTIC 0.280 0.029 0.020 0.007 0.026 0.013 0.011 0.016 0.164 0.067 0.037 0.059 0.062 0.056 0.049 0.104
NON-MET 0.228 0.025 0.009 0.008 0.022 0.010 0.011 0.014 0.113 0.044 0.017 0.038 0.057 0.078 0.045 0.281
METAL 0.281 0.025 0.011 0.008 0.024 0.015 0.011 0.012 0.171 0.079 0.040 0.049 0.059 0.058 0.049 0.109
M&E 0.225 0.033 0.017 0.011 0.033 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.153 0.078 0.038 0.048 0.072 0.070 0.053 0.130
ELEC 0.227 0.026 0.017 0.010 0.039 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.155 0.074 0.047 0.056 0.073 0.063 0.060 0.101
VEHIC 0.214 0.023 0.015 0.008 0.024 0.019 0.006 0.010 0.178 0.100 0.036 0.055 0.083 0.065 0.053 0.112
NEC 0.291 0.032 0.013 0.008 0.026 0.014 0.008 0.019 0.169 0.066 0.034 0.043 0.055 0.051 0.063 0.110
INNOVATORS
FOOD 0.199 0.030 0.015 0.013 0.035 0.035 0.005 0.020 0.118 0.063 0.023 0.038 0.058 0.073 0.045 0.231
TEXTILE 0.241 0.029 0.012 0.012 0.025 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.192 0.084 0.040 0.053 0.075 0.056 0.055 0.089
WOOD 0.185 0.019 0.009 0.005 0.023 0.016 0.012 0.019 0.127 0.049 0.021 0.039 0.065 0.097 0.046 0.270
CHEM 0.204 0.059 0.009 0.012 0.027 0.032 0.007 0.016 0.140 0.090 0.028 0.075 0.060 0.089 0.037 0.115
PLASTIC 0.226 0.026 0.012 0.007 0.040 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.166 0.068 0.040 0.070 0.082 0.065 0.051 0.084
NON-MET 0.160 0.042 0.003 0.017 0.031 0.017 0.011 0.017 0.098 0.045 0.020 0.028 0.078 0.098 0.053 0.283
METAL 0.209 0.029 0.012 0.009 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.012 0.185 0.089 0.049 0.051 0.061 0.074 0.056 0.096
M&E 0.169 0.039 0.022 0.013 0.040 0.021 0.013 0.015 0.155 0.081 0.041 0.052 0.077 0.075 0.049 0.140
ELEC 0.173 0.026 0.016 0.013 0.044 0.026 0.017 0.016 0.165 0.076 0.052 0.065 0.090 0.070 0.052 0.099
VEHIC 0.135 0.029 0.017 0.012 0.035 0.020 0.009 0.006 0.195 0.095 0.049 0.063 0.095 0.081 0.049 0.112
NEC 0.254 0.040 0.015 0.012 0.037 0.032 0.012 0.020 0.168 0.057 0.054 0.027 0.077 0.054 0.054 0.086
Obstacle Definition: 1= Lack of appropriate sources of finance, 2= Lack of skilled personnel, 3= Lack of opportunities for
cooperation with other firms and technological institutions, 4= Legislation, norms, regulations, standards, taxation.
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Table 3: Test of Complementarity in Innovation Policy
p-values of weak supermodularity tests (generalized tobit)
Probability to innovate Amount of innovation
Pairs of obstacles 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4
Industries
FOOD 0.956 0.984 0.815 0.612 0.852 0.966 0.949 0.986 0.912 0.993 0.983 0.998
TEXTILE 0.950 0.981 0.953 0.942 0.787 0.912 0.826 0.978 0.939 0.998 0.975 0.998
WOOD 0.961 0.842 0.990 0.849 0.932 0.975 0.968 0.990 0.930 0.908 0.993 0.999
CHEM 0.996 0.899 0.989 0.616 0.923 0.845 0.929 0.879 0.992 0.826 0.951 0.973
PLASTIC 0.759 0.937 0.832 0.911 0.844 0.923 0.732 0.996 0.681 0.998 0.974 0.947
NON-MET 0.992 0.891 0.892 0.961 0.927 0.951 0.893 0.994 0.887 0.998 0.925 0.991
METAL 0.767 0.945 0.847 0.943 0.966 0.690 0.908 0.897 0.971 0.946 0.951 0.477
M&E 0.971 0.996 0.965 0.498 0.979 0.961 0.977 0.999 0.999 0.997 0.998 0.999
ELEC 0.913 0.986 0.876 0.471 0.906 0.999 0.996 0.885 0.944 0.942 0.994 0.999
VEHIC 0.990 0.943 0.977 0.562 0.956 0.935 0.996 0.900 0.981 0.995 0.939 0.995
NEC 0.932 0.930 0.917 0.819 0.995 0.818 0.996 0.972 0.949 0.994 0.792 0.866
Obstacle Definition: 1= Lack of appropriate sources of finance, 2= Lack of skilled personnel, 3= Lack of
opportunities for cooperation with other firms and technological institutions, 4= Legislation, norms, regulations,
standards, taxation.
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table 4: Test of Complementarity in Innovation Policy
p-values of strong supermodularity tests (generalized tobit)
Probability to innovate Amount of innovation
Pairs of obstacles 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4
Industries
FOOD 0.044 0.016 0.185 0.388 0.148 0.034 0.051 0.014 0.088 0.007 0.017 0.002
TEXTILE 0.050 0.019 0.047 0.048 0.213 0.088 0.174 0.022 0.061 0.002 0.025 0.002
WOOD 0.039 0.048 0.010 0.151 0.068 0.025 0.032 0.010 0.070 0.092 0.007 0.001
CHEM 0.004 0.101 0.011 0.384 0.077 0.155 0.071 0.121 0.008 0.174 0.049 0.027
PLASTIC 0.241 0.063 0.168 0.089 0.156 0.077 0.268 0.004 0.319 0.002 0.026 0.053
NON-MET 0.008 0.109 0.108 0.039 0.073 0.049 0.107 0.006 0.113 0.002 0.075 0.009
METAL 0.233 0.055 0.153 0.057 0.034 0.310 0.092 0.103 0.029 0.054 0.049 0.523
M&E 0.029 0.004 0.035 0.502 0.021 0.039 0.023 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001
ELEC 0.087 0.014 0.124 0.529 0.094 0.001 0.004 0.115 0.056 0.058 0.006 0.001
VEHIC 0.010 0.057 0.023 0.438 0.044 0.065 0.004 0.100 0.019 0.005 0.061 0.005
NEC 0.068 0.070 0.083 0.181 0.005 0.182 0.004 0.028 0.051 0.006 0.208 0.134
Obstacle Definition: 1= Lack of appropriate sources of finance, 2= Lack of skilled personnel, 3= Lack of
opportunities for cooperation with other firms and technological institutions, 4= Legislation, norms, regulations,
standards, taxation.
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Appendix 1
Industry Definitions
Industry NACE code Description of Industry
FOOD 15-16 food, beverages and tobacco
TEXTILE 17-19 textiles, wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur,
tannings, and dressing of leather, luggage, handbags, saddlery,
harness and footwear
WOOD 20-22 wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture,
straw and plaiting materials, pulp, paper, and paper products,
publishing, printing, and reproduction of recorded media
CHEM 23-24 refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, chemicals and
chemical products
PLASTIC 25 rubber and plastic products
NON-MET 26 other non-metallic mineral products
METAL 27-28 basic metals, fabricated metal products, except machinery
and equipment
M&E 29 machinery and equipment
ELEC 30-33 office machinery and computers, electrical machinery and
apparatus, radio, television and communication equipment and
apparatus, medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and
clocks.
VEHIC 34-35 motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers, and other transport
equipment
NEC 36 furniture
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Appendix 2
Obstacles to innovation*
Category 1: Risk and finance
Excessive perceived risk
Lack of appropriate sources of finance
Innovation costs too high
Pay-off period of innovation too long
Category 2: Knowledge-skill within enterprise
Enterprises’s innovation potential too small
Lack of skilled personnel
Lack of information on technologies
Lack of information on markets
Innovation costs hard to control
Resistance of change in the enterprise
Category 3: Knowledge-skill outside the enterprise
Deficiencies in the availability of external technical services
Lack of opportunities for cooperation with other firms and technological institutions
Lack of technological opportunities
No need to innovate due to earlier innovations
Category 4: Regulations
Innovation too easy to copy
Legislation, norms, regulations, standards, taxation
Lack of customer responsiveness to new products and processes
Uncertainty in timing of innovation
                                                
*
 The representative obstacles used in the analysis of this paper are in bold.
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